Abstract. As reported by Neumann and Klotz [1994, in Attention and Performance XV Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing Eds C Umilta, M Moscovitch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) pp 123 -150], a geometric shape masked by metacontrast can affect response latency (RT) even if it is not visible, ie if it yields a d! value of zero in a signal-detection (SD) task (metacontrast dissociation). In the initial study as well as in most subsequent experiments, the RT task was manual and the SD task was verbal. Hence tasks and output modes were confounded. In the present study, two experiments were conducted to find out which of these factors is responsible for the metacontrast dissociation. In experiment 1, participants performed an RT task in either a manual or a verbal output mode. In experiment 2, these output modes were compared in an SD task. Independently of output modes, the masked primes affected RT but could not be detected in the SD task. It is concluded that tasks, but not output modes, are crucial for the metacontrast dissociation. Implications for the mechanisms underlying the metacontrast dissociation and for the functional difference between judgments and responses are discussed.
Introduction
Studies from various research areas have demonstrated dissociations between what people can report about a stimulus and how they respond to it manually or with some other motor response, eg a saccade (Aschersleben and Miisseler, submitted; Bridgeman et al 1997; Castielo et al 1991; Jaskowski 1996; Klotz and Neumann, in press; Neumann 1989 Neumann , 1990 Neumann and Klotz 1994; Neumann et al 1992) . For example, it has been found that induced motion of a target has a strong effect on a verbal report about where it is located, but leaves manual pointing to it essentially unaffected (Bridgeman et al 1979 (Bridgeman et al , 1981 ; and stimuli that are all but invisible owing to metacontrast masking have been shown to strongly affect manual reaction times (Fehrer and Raab 1962; Neumann 1982) .
The dissociation that we explore in this study is the metacontrast dissociation (Klotz and Neumann, in press; Klotz and Wolff 1995; Neumann and Klotz 1994; Neumann et al 1993) . Basically, the experimental paradigm is a combination of a metacontrast and a priming experiment. Metacontrast is a form of visual backward masking (Breitmeyer 1984; Kahneman 1968; Schiller and Smith 1966; Stigler 1910; Weisstein 1972; Werner 1935) . Of two spatially nonoverlapping, laterally adjacent stimuli presented in temporal succession, the visibility of the first is impaired owing to the presentation of the second. In the version of the metacontrast-dissociation paradigm used in the present study, the second stimulus (the target) was either a square or a diamond, and the first, masked stimulus (the prime) was a smaller square or diamond, or a smaller circular shape (figure 1). Participants had to press a left or right button, depending on whether the target was a square or a diamond.
In this paradigm, the masked primes affect response latency (RT) even though they cannot be discriminated. As compared with the neutral prime (the circular shape in the present version of the paradigm), a congruent prime (a square preceding a square or a diamond preceding a diamond) reduces RT, whereas an incongruent prime (a diamond r ^i Figure 1 . Stimuli employed in experiments 1 and 2. The primes fitted into the inner contours of the targets and were approximately 70% of their size. Stimuli appeared 3.4 deg either above or below fixation in a random order. The target was either a square or a diamond. The prime was either a smaller replica of the target (eg a square preceding a square; 'congruent'), or a smaller replica of the alternative target (eg a square preceding a diamond; 'incongruent'), or one of the two circular shapes.
preceding a square or a square preceding a diamond) increases RT. Similar effects have been found with respect to error rate. This is true even if discriminability is strictly zero in a signal-detection (SD) part of the experiment in which participants are shown the same stimuli as in the RT part, and are required to scale their confidence that a signal (for example, a square or diamond) rather than noise (for example, a circular shape) was presented as the prime. The dissociation is stable and has meanwhile been replicated in other laboratories with different versions of metacontrast stimuli (Leuthold and Kopp 1998; Vorberg 1998) and pattern masking (Eimer and Schlaghecken, in press; Schlaghecken and Eimer 1997) . It is not an artifact of the fact that responses in the SD task are normally associated with longer latencies than responses in the RT task. As we (Klotz and Neumann, in press , experiment 1) have shown, the pattern of results remains unchanged when SD judgments have to be produced under a speed instruction, leading to latencies in the same range as in the RT task.
This pattern of results suggests that there is a dissociation in the sense that masked primes affect motor responses although they are not consciously perceived. This interpretation involves, however, an inference. At a purely empirical level, the finding is that performance in one task (responding by pressing a button) is different from performance in a second task (responding by choosing a value on a confidence scale). The inference is that the latter task reflects (a lack of) conscious experience, whereas the former is not, at least not necessarily, related to conscious perception. This assumption is, it seems, based on the different character of the two tasks. In an RT task, participants have to emit a response; in the SD task they have to make & judgment. As Neumann and Miisseler (1990) have argued, these are different types of tasks, though the borderline between them may sometimes be blurred. Judgment tasks require people to communicate what they perceive. A judgment refers to an experienced stimulus event. Participants report about this event, either verbally or by some other means of communication such as pointing or hitting a button. By contrast, RT tasks are performance tasks that require participants to achieve a maximum of speed and accuracy when executing an action. Again, the response modality may vary. Though manual responding is the most common output mode, there have also been classical studies on choice RT that have involved verbal responses (eg Fraisse 1969; Morin et al 1965) . In short, a judgment, whether verbal or by using some other means of communication, has a content to which it refers. A response, whether manual or verbal, has a stimulus that elicits it.
While the distinction between judgment and response is thus logically independent of whether the output mode is verbal or nonverbal, the two types of tasks have often been empirically confounded with output modes. This has also been the case for the < > < > V S primes targets metacontrast dissociation. In the versions of this paradigm that have so far been explored, response tasks have been associated with a manual output mode, and judgment tasks have either required overt verbal judgments or were constructed in such a way that covert verbal processing was likely to have occurred (see below). Thus, it could be that the dissociation reflects-wholly or, which is more plausible, partially-a difference between output modes rather than between a judgment task and a response task as such. This is more than a logical possibility. In manual responding, the visual input activates motor structures that control the hand and fingers. There is some evidence from animal studies that there are structures in the posterior parietal cortex that serve as a visuomotor interface, connecting specific visual inputs to specific motor control structures (Andersen 1995; Goodale and Milner 1992; Milner and Goodale 1995; Rizzolatti et al 1994) . These specific connections might function without conscious perception, whereas a verbal output mode might require a conscious representation as a prerequisite. This would be in accordance with the widespread assumption that speech is intimately related to consciousness (see eg Dennett 1991 for an eloquent defence of this position). A verbal component might even be involved if participants do not actually speak, as was the case in most of our SD experiments in which they indicated their choice by moving the cursor to an appropriate position on the monitor screen and clicking. This could still be a verbal task, because evaluating the stimulus and making a decision may depend on some kind of 'inner speech' or verbalisation. In other words, there could be covert verbal mediation even if there is no overt verbal responding.
A clarification of this possible confounding between tasks and output modes is thus of some theoretical interest. To test if the distinction between verbal and manual responding contributes to the metacontrast dissociation, the factors 'verbal vs manual output mode' and 'judgment vs response task' have to be varied independently. If only output mode is critical (an admittedly unlikely possibility), then one would expect the dissociation to break down if both tasks are verbal or both are nonverbal. If only task is critical, then the dissociation between the psychophysical detection task and the RT performance task should be independent of output modes. At least two further patterns of results might occur. First, it could be that the metacontrast dissociation is only found between conditions in which manual responses are contrasted with verbal judgments, as in the standard version of the metacontrast-dissociation paradigm. In other words, it could be that either verbal responses in the RT task do not exhibit an effect of the prime (perhaps because this effect is mediated by a specific neuronal mechanism for manual control), or that the detectability of the prime is no longer zero in a judgment task with manual output (perhaps because only verbal output depends on consciousness). A second possibility is that the primes are undetectable with both verbal and manual output modes in the judgment task, and that they affect RT and error rate in both output modes in the response task, but that the latter effect is numerically different for verbal and manual responses. In this case, the dissociation would be basically task dependent, but the effect of tasks would be modulated by output mode.
(1)
To decide between these possibilities, two experiments were conducted that, taken together, provided an orthogonal combination of output modes (manual, verbal) and tasks (RT, SD). Experiment 1 consisted of a replication of the manual RT task from previous studies, to which a verbal-output condition was added in which participants uttered the words "left" or "right" instead of hitting a left or right button in response to the identity of the target. In experiment 2 we investigated the SD task. As in the RT task, responding was verbal in one condition and manual in the other. To minimise (1) Note that the opposite outcome is ruled out, since a dissociation, in the present sense of the term, requires by definition that the masked prime cannot be discriminated in a judgment task. Hence the finding that the detectability of the prime is different from zero for one of the output modes would by definition abolish the dissociation for that output mode. the probability of verbal mediation in the manual condition, only two response categories (target present or target absent) were employed. In the verbal-output condition, participants said "yes" or "no" to indicate whether a signal had been presented; in the manualoutput condition they pressed one of two buttons to indicate their choice.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 replicated the RT task from one of our previous studies (Klotz and Wolff 1995) with the extension that there was a verbal-output condition in addition to the manual-output condition.
2.1 Method 2.1.1 Participants. Twenty-eight students from Bielefeld University took part in the experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They participated in partial fulfillment of course requirements.
Stimuli and apparatus.
The experiment was controlled by a microprocessor. Stimuli were displayed on a computer monitor and were presented black (< 1 cd m~2) on a bright background (108 cd m -2 ). The target was either a square or a diamond (a square rotated by 45°). The prime was either a smaller diamond or a smaller square (congruent/ incongruent) or a circular shape (neutral) (see figure 1 ). The prime-target sequence appeared 3.4 deg either above or below the centre of the screen. Targets had a side length of 1.6 deg. Primes were constructed so that their outer contours fitted into the inner contours of the targets. They were about 70% of the size of the targets. Viewing distance was held constant at 80 cm by using a headrest. In the manual task, the participants' forefingers rested on the left and right mouse buttons, and they responded by pressing the button assigned to the target. Response latency was measured to the nearest millisecond. In the verbal task, a voice key was used. In both response modes, participants entered errors via the mouse. In the manual mode they clicked in one of two boxes, marked "correct" and "incorrect". There was an additional box for nonverbal errors, such as clearing one's throat, in the verbal mode. The 'incorrect' category included responses that started with the incorrect response, for example saying "light" instead of "right" in the verbal mode. The reliability of this mode of error registration was checked by comparing it against automatic error registration in the manual response mode. No systematic deviations were found.
Procedure.
A trial started with four small rectangles that moved on diagonal trajectories from the four corners of the screen towards the centre where they merged into one fixation point (figure 2). This took 750 ms, after which the fixation point was turned off. This procedure was intended to ensure that attention was directed to the fixation point. Participants were instructed to keep fixation on the centre of the screen throughout the trial. Immediately after the fixation point disappeared a prime was presented for 30 ms. The screen was blank for the next 45 ms, after which the target was presented at the position of the prime for 90 ms.
The experiment consisted of two blocks. In one block responding was manual. For half of the participants, the square was associated with the left response and the diamond with the right response. This assignment was reversed for the other half. In the other block responding was verbal. Participants uttered the German words for "left" and "right". Assignment to the stimuli was the same as with manual responding. In each block there were 120 congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials. In congruent trials the prime was a smaller replica of the target. In incongruent trials it was a smaller replica of the shape associated with the alternative response. The prime in the neutral trials was of circular shape. These three conditions and the positions of the prime/target pair below or above fixation were presented in a random order, different for each participant and block. Each block began with approximately 40 practice trials. Participants had to respond within 1.5 s, after which delay the next trial was started automatically. The intertrial interval was 2.3 s, and the total duration of the experiment was approximately 90 min. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible, but to avoid errors.
Results
Median RTs and error rates were computed for each participant and entered into ANOVAs with the factors condition (congruent, incongruent, and neutral) and output mode (verbal vs manual). Results are shown in figure 3. The ANOVA for RTs yielded highly significant main effects of both factors (for condition, i^5 4 = 138.48, p < 0.001; for output mode, F x 27 = 14.1, p < 0.001). The interaction was not significant^ 54 =0.71, p = 0.49). RTwas shortest in the congruent condition (495 ms), followed by the neutral (517 ms) and incongruent conditions (554 ms). Tukey tests revealed that all conditions differed from each other (p < 0.01). Mean RTwas longer in the verbal (539 ms) than in the manual output mode (505 ms). For the error analysis, verbal and nonverbal errors were combined in the verbal condition, since the latter type was extremely rare. Error rates were arcsine transformed before being entered into the ANOVA. There were significant main effects (for condition, F 2 54 =20.6, p < 0.001; for output mode, F { 27 = 13.53, p < 0.01) as well as a significant interaction (F 2 54 = 7.36, p < 0.01). In the manual output mode, error rates were higher in the incongruent condition (6.2%) than in both the congruent (2.4%) and neutral conditions (3.1%). All other a posteriori comparisons failed to reach significance, indicating that the interaction was mainly due to an increased error rate in the incongruent manual condition.
Discussion
The effect of masked primes on RT found in previous studies was replicated in experiment 1. As compared with the neutral condition, incongruent primes led to increased RTs, whereas congruent primes reduced RT. This pattern was identical in both output modes, as indicated by the absence of any interaction between output modes and conditions. Across all conditions, there was a constant difference of about 30 to 40 ms between verbal and manual responses, which is, however, of little importance in our present context. It may simply have been due to a differential sensitivity of the recording equipment. (The threshold of the voice key was set at a relatively high level to prevent activation by irrelevant input such as breathing noises.) Alternatively, motor programming may have taken more time for the verbal as compared with the manual responses. Differences in speed -accuracy trade-off could also have played a role (see below). The absence of an interaction with conditions indicates that, whatever its locus, this effect is likely to be unrelated to the priming effect.
The pattern of errors was qualitatively similar to that from previous studies: error rate was slightly reduced in the congruent and elevated in the incongruent condition. However, the only difference between means to reach statistical significance was the increased error rate in the incongruent as compared with the other two conditions when responding was manual. Together with the significant interaction between conditions and output modes this suggests that the incongruent prime had a stronger effect on error rate in the manual than in the verbal output mode. One possible explanation is a difference in the setting of the response criterion. For example, there might be a more efficient output editing for verbal than for manual responses, enabling participants to prevent the erroneous response tendencies, caused by an incongruent prime, from triggering an actual overt response. A difference with respect to speed -accuracy trade-off may also have contributed to the generally longer RTs in the verbal than in the manual output mode.
With respect to its main purpose, the results from experiment 1 are unequivocal. The effect of the masked prime was definitely not restricted to manual responses, rendering it unlikely that the metacontrast dissociation is entirely due to different output modes. However, as discussed in section 1, this finding in itself does not yet prove that the dissociation is exclusively based on the difference between a response task and a judgment task. To decide between the remaining possibilities, we have to examine the judgment task. In experiment 2 we compared the detectability of masked primes when verbal and manual output modes were used.
Experiment 2
Besides the RT task replicated in experiment 1, the study of Klotz and Wolff (1995) encompassed a SD task in which participants indicated their confidence that a targetlike prime (a square or a diamond) rather than a neutral prime (a circular shape) preceded the target. Detectability of target-like primes was not different from zero, a result that has regularly been found in experiments with the metacontrast-dissociation paradigm (eg Klotz and Neumann, in press; Neumann and Klotz 1994) . Experiment 2 replicated this second part of the Klotz and Wolff (1995) study with a verbal and a manual output mode. To render experiments 1 and 2 as comparable as possible, only two alternative judgments were used in both output modes.
3.1 Method 3.1.1 Participants. Fourteen students from Bielefeld University participated in the experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were paid DM20 (approximately $12). To keep motivation high, an additional award of DM5 (approximately $3) was offered if a participant achieved a discrimination index of d' > 0.2 in either the verbal or the manual block.
3.1.2 Stimuli and apparatus. These were the same as in experiment 1.
3.1.3 Procedure. Conditions were the same as in experiment 1. The only difference concerned the task. Slow-motion versions of the stimulus sequences were presented before the beginning of the first block, and participants were informed about the presence of masked primes in the subsequent trials. They were told that the prime could be either a smaller replica of one of the targets (a signal) or a circular shape (noise), and that their task was to detect the presence of a signal. If they believed that the prime had been a signal, they were to respond "y es " otherwise "no". No specifications about where to set the criterion were given. As in experiment 1, there was a manual and a verbal block, whose order was counterbalanced across subjects. In the verbal block, participants responded by uttering (the German words for) "yes" or "no". In the manual block, they pressed either the left or the right mouse button. Assignment of the buttons to the responses was balanced across participants. The response had to be given within 3 s. After this delay, the next trial was initiated automatically. (Green and Swets 1966) were computed for each output mode. Separate Mests were used to test d' against zero. The alpha probability for maintaining the null hypothesis was set at p > 0.20. In both output modes there was no indication of significant deviations from zero (for the manual mode, d' = 0.007; t u = 0.17, p = 0.87; for the verbal mode, d' = -0.02; t 13 = -0.70, p = 0.50)/ 2 > Results are shown in figure 4. Thus, experiment 2 replicated the results from the judgment task of Klotz and Wolff (1995) and demonstrated that the masked primes could not be discriminated. This lack of discrimination is not due to the fact that, in order to render the two tasks as similar as possible, only two response categories were used in the present task. We previously (Klotz and Neumann, in press) compared this two-response variant with a variant in which participants scaled their confidence that a signal had been presented on a five-point scale. Results were identical.
Results and discussion d' indices of discrimination performance
The absence of any discrimination between primes was found for both output modes. Together with the replication of the effects of the masked primes on RT for both output modes in experiment 1, this is strong evidence that the metacontrast dissociation can be found with verbal as well as with manual output modes. In terms of the distinction suggested in section 1, we can conclude that it is essentially a dissociation between a judgment task and a response task, rather than between a verbal task and a manual task.
(2) It could be argued that this zero performance was due to the longer latencies of the discrimination judgment as compared with the RTs in experiment 1. To test this possibility, the analysis was repeated for the fastest 50% of the manual judgments. Their mean latency was 542 ms, which was not significantly different from the mean latency in the manual RT task (505 ms; t 40 =0.91, p = 0.37). Performance was again not different from zero (d' = 0.008; t l3 =-0.124, p = 0.9). (This analysis was not possible for judgments in the verbal mode because latencies were not recorded.) 
General discussion

Summary of results and general implications
The present study represents an attempt to disentangle two variables that have previously been confounded in experiments on the metacontrast dissociation, viz type of task (response task vs judgment task) and output mode (manual vs verbal responding). Experiment 1 was a response (choice RT) task, in which the effects of masked primes on RT and error rate were assessed. Experiment 2 was a judgment task in which participants had to indicate whether or not a relevant prime (a smaller replica of one of the targets) had preceded the mask. In both experiments, output could be either manual or verbal. To determine the effect of output mode independently of tasks, the RT task and the judgment task were made identical in every respect, except for those aspects where they had to be different owing to the inherent character of each task. The stimuli were exactly the same, including priming conditions and number of stimuli in each condition. In both tasks, participants had to choose between two alternatives. In the manual output mode, the responses in the two tasks were identical (pressing the left or right mouse button with the left or right forefinger). In the verbal mode, the only difference at the output side was that different pairs of one-syllable words constituted the response alternatives.
This high degree of similarity between the output modes in the two tasks justifies the conclusion that differences between the tasks cannot be attributed to hidden effects of output mode. The main findings were unequivocal. Performance was zero in the judgment task, whether the judgment was verbal or manual. By contrast, congruent and incongruent primes affected RT, again independently of whether responding was verbal or manual. It seems clear that the metacontrast dissociation is basically an effect of task rather than output mode.
Besides the possibility that only one of these factors is responsible for the metacontrast dissociation, we had considered two further eventualities. The first was that both factors are equally constitutive for the dissociation, ie that it occurs only between a verbal-judgment task and a manual-response task. This is clearly refuted by the data. The other possibility was that the dissociation is basically a dissociation between tasks, but that output modes modulate its strength. More specifically, it could be that response modes do not affect the judgment task, but that the effect of the prime in the response task varies in strength between manual and verbal responding. This latter possibility cannot yet be rejected on the basis of the present data. The finding that there was no interaction between conditions and output modes for the RT data in experiment 1 argues against it; but there was an interaction with respect to error rate. This interaction was due to more errors in manual than in verbal trials when the prime was incongruent. Thus, the possibility remains that the effect of the masked prime on performance in the response task is somewhat larger in the manual than in the verbal mode, at least as far as errors are concerned.
Direct versus indirect measures
While our experiments have shown that the metacontrast dissociation is not due to a confounding between types of tasks and response modes, there is another possible confounding inherent in the metacontrast-dissociation paradigm.
(3) In the discrimination task, participants were instructed to attend to the prime, trying to discriminate between different primes. By contrast, the RT task directed participants' attention to the target. Indeed, they were unaware that there were primes preceding the targets. Thus, the prime could not be consciously discriminated as assessed by a direct measure (in a task directed to it), while its motor effect emerged in an indirect measure (in a task directed to the target). The direct/indirect distinction, as these terms are used here, is orthogonal to the distinction between judgment and response. This can be illustrated by a thought experiment: we could have asked participants to perform the RT task with the prime rather than the target as their imperative stimulus, and we could have asked them to discriminate between targets rather than primes in the discrimination task. Thus, instead of contrasting a response to the target (an indirect measure of prime processing) with a judgment about the prime (a direct measure), we could have contrasted a response to the prime (direct measure) with a judgment about the target (an indirect measure of prime processing).
It is, however, unlikely that the difference between the two tasks is due to the direct/indirect distinction rather than the difference between judgment and response. If the former were the case, then the dissociation should disappear if both tasks involve direct measures or if both involve indirect measures. Though this comparison has not yet been carried out in a special study, there are data from other experiments that render such outcomes highly improbable. Our earlier study (Klotz and Neumann, in press) included several experiments in which participants were encouraged to use all available cues, including changes in the appearance of the target, to discriminate between primes. For example, they received training with the discrimination task (Klotz and Neumann, in press , experiments 2 and 3), could gain a substantial financial award if their discrimination was above chance (experiment 4), or were asked to scale the strength of flickering of the target (experiment 9). These experiments were sensitive to indirect effects of the prime in the judgment task, but absolutely no such effects were found. Discrimination between priming conditions was zero, although the primes had differential effects on RT. Thus, there was a dissociation between judgment and response even if both tasks involved indirect measures. In the present study, participants were likewise free to use any cue they wished, including indirect effects of the primes on the targets.
Early versus late dissociation
Although the main motive for this study has been to clarify the effect of output mode as a potential confounding variable, the results are also relevant to an understanding of the functional basis of the metacontrast dissociation. This dissociation implies that parameters of motor responses (when and/or how to respond) can be determined by sensory information that is not represented in conscious awareness. We call this direct parameter specification (Neumann 1989 (Neumann , 1990 Neumann and Klotz 1994) . The existence of direct parameter specification seems by now fairly well established (eg Klotz and Neumann, in press; Klotz and Wolff 1995; Leuthold and Kopp 1998; Vorberg 1998; (3) We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for confronting us with this argument. Wolff 1989 Wolff , 1997 ; for a review see Neumann et al 1998) . By contrast, the underlying mechanisms are still largely unknown. As a first step towards an understanding of how direct parameter specification is brought about, a late-dissociation and an earlydissociation view may be distinguished (see Klotz and Neumann, in press; Neumann et al 1998) .
An early dissociation, as the term is used here, is a dissociation that already takes place in the visual system. Various dissociations have been found in neurological patients that bear an at least superficial similarity with the metacontrast dissociation (eg Goodale et al 1991; Kentridge et al 1997) . Goodale (1993, 1995; Goodale and Milner 1992) have argued that many of these dissociations can be related to the neuroanatomical distinction between a dorsal processing stream, subserving the visual control of movements such as grasping, and a ventral stream that underlies object identification. A dissociation occurs if either the ventral or the dorsal stream is selectively impaired. In the former case, the patient can still manually respond to certain stimulus properties such as size or orientation. However, owing to the loss of processing in the ventral stream, stimulus identification and, therefore, a judgment of stimulus properties, is impossible or strongly impaired (eg Goodale et al 1991) . It is tempting to think of the metacontrast dissociation as a kind of artificial dissociation of this type, where an impairment of ventral processing is temporarily caused by the mask, while the mask leaves processing in the dorsal stream unaffected (Neumann et al 1998) .
In the late-dissociation view it is assumed that there is a single stream of visual processing that feeds into both motor output and those processes that are associated with conscious perception. Direct parameter specification occurs, according to this view, not because there is a branching within visual processing, but because the results of this single processing stream are available at different times, depending on whether a response or a judgment is required. As soon as visual processing has reached a stage where stimulus identification starts, it begins to influence motor activation ('continuous flow'; see eg Miller et al 1992; Smid et al 1990) . At this stage there is, however, not yet a conscious representation. Conscious perception only develops when the stream of processing has reached a later stage. The metacontrast dissociation can be explained on this basis by assuming that, at this later stage, the mask has already replaced the prime. Therefore, the prime is not represented in conscious perception, although it affects the continuous flow into the motor system. The present data provide some evidence relevant to the distinction between the earlydissociation and late-dissociation views. The highly similar effects of masked primes on outputs as different as pressing a button and uttering a word suggest that the pathway from stimulus to response that mediates direct parameter specification is not particular to a specialised subsystem, eg for the visual control of hand or finger movements. As summarised by Milner and Goodale (1995) , motor control via the dorsal stream seems to be related to these kinds of parameter specification. There is, to our knowledge, so far no evidence that a verbal response to a visual stimulus might likewise be mediated by the dorsal stream. Therefore the similarity of results for the two output modes with respect to the metacontrast dissociation cannot be easily reconciled with an early-dissociation view based on the dorsal/ventral distinction as it stands presently. Corroborative evidence comes from a recent study by Kibele et al (submitted) in which three kinds of motor responses (pressing a foot pedal, jumping, performing a hit with a tennis racket) were compared. All three types of responses exhibited the metacontrast dissociation and, more importantly, priming conditions and tasks had perfectly additive effects on RT Thus, it seems that the effect of the masked prime is not related to specific sensorimotor pathways. This suggests that direct parameter specification by stimulus information that is not represented in conscious awareness may be a rather general phenomenon.
What distinguishes judgments from responses?
So far, we have distinguished judgments and responses in terms of task requirements. In a response task, the participants are instructed to make a movement or say a word when a certain stimulus appears. In a judgment task, we ask them to report on what they see. What distinguishes these two tasks functionally? This question is related to, but not identical with, the issue of early/late dissociation. Early and late dissociation are theoretical options as to where in processing there is a branching between those processes that lead to conscious perception and those processes that subserve response activation in the case of direct parameter specification. Conscious perception is, however, not yet a judgment; and there is no reason to assume that all responses are based on direct parameter specification. [Indeed, there is evidence that direct parameter specification may be restricted to relatively simple tasks (eg Neumann and Klotz 1994; Wolff 1997) .] Therefore, the issue of what distinguishes judgments from responses at the functional level has to be treated independently of the issue of where the dissociation is located.
In conclusion, we sketch one tentative answer. The basic assumption is that, as a consequence of the instruction, action planning takes place, ie a conditional readiness is set up to activate a certain output if certain conditions are met, and to initiate the output if the activation exceeds a threshold (Neumann and Prinz 1987; Prinz 1990; Wolff 1997 ). Our suggestion is that the difference between responses and judgments regards the kinds of conditions required for output initiation. In a response task, the only requirement for initiation is that the appropriate sensory information feeds into the motor system and activates the response to a sufficient level. This information may come from processes not associated with conscious perception, as in the case of direct parameter specification, or from processes associated with conscious perception, as may be the case when the task is more complex. In the case of direct parameter specification, the branching may occur according to the early-dissociation assumption or according to the late-dissociation assumption.
What distinguishes a judgment task from these variants of responding is, according to the present suggestion, that an additional requirement has to be met before motor output is initiated (be it verbal, as is usually the case, or manual, as in the manual part of experiment 2). This requirement is that, in addition to sensory input into motor structures, there has to be what might be called confirmatory input. One way of conceptualising this is that there is a feedback loop in which the motor activation is tested against conscious perception before the response is initiated. If this is correct, then a judgment task can be turned into a response task by skipping this additional requirement, ie by asking participants to guess instead of reporting what they see. As Marcel (1993) has shown, this change of the instruction has indeed the effect of dramatically enhancing the effect of a masked stimulus on motor output.
